

## Message Text

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STADIS////////////////////////////////////  
EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS FOR UNDERSECRETARY NEWSOM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, XD, XZ

SUBJECT: DRAFT AGENDA FOR PRC MEETING

WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE PRC  
MEETING ON SOUTH ASIA AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA/PERSIAN  
GULF AREA AND THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN READING  
IT ON THE WAY HOME.

ISSUE.

UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM HAS CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION OF WIDE-  
SPREAD REGIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR  
THE AREA AS A RESULT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS INSTALLED IN  
THE PDRY AND AFGHANISTAN. WHAT COULD/SHOULD WE DO TO MEET  
THE CONCERN?

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BACKGROUND.

MOST REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS SEE THE NEW AFGHAN AND PDRY GOVERN-  
MENTS AS INSTALLED BY AND/OR COMPLETELY SUBSERVIENT TO THE  
SOVIET UNION. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL  
USE ITS POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THESE COUNTRIES AS A SPRING-  
BOARD FOR EXTENDING ITS POWER AND INFLUENCE IN OTHER PARTS  
OF THE REGION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY SEE THE U.S. AS

LACKING IN RESOLVE OR ABILITY TO STEM SOVIET ADVANCES OR

TO HELP REGIONAL COUNTRIES TO DO SO. U.S. POLICIES AND CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS ARMS TRANSFERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BUTTRESS THIS CONCLUSION.

WHILE THEIR EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN AND SENSE OF INCREASED VULNERABILITY ARE SOMETIMES OVERSTATED, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY ARE BASICALLY GENUINE AND DEEP-SEATED. SEVERAL COUNTRIES, MOST NOTABLY TURKEY AND PAKISTAN, ARE ACTIVELY REEXAMINING THEIR POLICIES IN THIS CONTEXT WITH THE VIEW OF POSSIBLY ADAPTING MORE NEUTRAL OR ACCOMMODATING POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING IS TO DISCUSS WHAT NEW STEPS, IF ANY, THE USG SHOULD INITIATE MULTILATERALLY OR BILATERALLY IN THE AREA TO REVERSE THIS TREND AND TO BOLSTER REGIONAL SELF-CONFIDENCE AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. IN CONSIDERING VARIOUS MEASURES, IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT SOME COULD WORK IN OPPOSITION TO OTHERS (E.G. STRENGTHENING CENTO AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND/OR IRAQ) OR WITH POLICIES THAT TRANSCEND THE AREA (E.G. INCREASED ARMS SUPPLIES WITH OUR ARMS RESTRAINT POLICIES).

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THE SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED DISCUSSION IS SO BROAD THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO HOLD MORE THAN ONE PRC MEETING ON THESE SUBJECTS. PERHAPS THE SUBJECT MATTER COULD BE MOST EASILY BROKEN DOWN INTO: (A) NEWSOM TRIP AND GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM; (B) MULTILATERAL RESPONSES; AND (C) BILATERAL RESPONSES.

AGENDA.

I. REPORT ON THE NEWSOM TRIP.

II. REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM. REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES. DO WE CONCUR IN AND SHOULD WE BASE OUR ACTIONS ON THE WIDESPREAD PERCEPTION OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS THAT THE AFGHAN AND YEMEN SITUATIONS REPRESENT CLEAR EXTENSIONS OF SOVIET POWER? WHAT WOULD BE THE SOVIET REACTION TO COUNTER STEPS INITIATED OR SUPPORTED BY THE U.S.? WHAT IMPACT WOULD THERE BE ON BROADER U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND, CONVERSELY, IS THERE ANY WAY TO BRING BROADER U.S.-USSR RELATIONS TO BEAR ON OUR REGIONAL CONCERNS IN A USEFUL WAY, E.G. DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN OR PUSHTOONISTAN?

III. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM.

A. MULTILATERAL.

1. CENTO. HOW IMPORTANT OR USEFUL IS CENTO TO US IN THE

PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES? WHILE ALL THREE REGIONAL MEMBERS

SEE LITTLE VALUE IN CENTO, IN DEALING WITH THEIR PROBLEMS  
WOULD THEY WISH TO SEE IT DISSOLVED OR MOTHBALLED? WOULD  
THERE BE ANY ADVANTAGES TO US IN THE DISSOLUTION OF CENTO  
AND THE POTENTIALLY ENHANCED ROLE OF ITS MEMBERS IN THE  
NAM?

ALTERNATIVELY, WOULD IT BE FEASIBLE/USEFUL TO STRENGTHEN  
CENTO? ARE THERE ACTIONS WE COULD TAKE OTHER THAN THOSE  
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CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION, I.E., INCREASED CENTO  
MILITARY EXERCISES, MORE HIGH LEVEL STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT  
OF CENTO, ENHANCED EXCHANGES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION  
AND POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS, GREATER CENTO IMPRIMATUR ON  
REGIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER?  
WOULD SUCH ACTIONS ALLAY THE CONCERNS OF THE THREE MEMBERS  
OR WOULD THEY SIMPLY BE SEEN AS COSMETIC? HOW ABOUT THE  
EFFECT ON OTHER REGIONAL COUNTRIES, E.G., WOULD THIS MAKE  
DIFFICULTIES FOR U.S. OBJECTIVES IN INDIA, IRAQ, AFGHANIS-  
TAN AND SAUDI ARABIA?

2. NEW ALIGNMENTS - INDIA - IRAN. RECOGNIZING THAT IRAN  
AND INDIA ARE THE PREDOMINANT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWERS  
IN THE AREA, IS THERE REAL POTENTIAL IN IRANIAN INITIATIVES  
FOR GREATER IRANIAN-INDIAN OR REGIONAL TIES? IS THERE ANY  
WAY TO PERSUADE PAKISTAN TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THESE  
INITIATIVES? IS THERE ANY ROLE FOR US OR WOULD OUR INVOL-  
VEMENT INHIBIT PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION?

3. NEW ALIGNMENTS - SAUDIA ARABIA - IRAN - PERSIAN GULF.  
IS THERE ANY PROSPECT THAT SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN AND PERSIAN  
GULF COUNTRIES COULD EXPAND THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND  
MILITARY COOPERATION AND EXPAND THE FOCUS AWAY FROM THE  
PERSIAN GULF TOWARDS THE NORTH AND EAST? IF SO, HOW COULD  
WE ENCOURAGE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT? WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, COULD  
WE PLAY, E.G. MID-EAST FORCE BASING OR TRAVELS BY HIGH  
LEVEL USG OFFICIALS.

B. BILATERAL.

1. PAKISTAN: DOES PAKISTAN REALLY HAVE A SOVIET OPTION  
AND, IF SO, WHAT WOULD IT BE? IF PAKISTAN "GOES IT ALONE"  
ON REPROCESSING WHAT SHOULD WE DO? ARE THEIR FURTHER STEPS  
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WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO GO IT ALONE?

IF PAKISTAN IS WILLING TO FOREGO REPROCESSING, WHAT  
POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS COULD WE OFFER? ARE THERE LEGAL OR  
POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH A U.S. STATEMENT ON THE DURAND LINE?

WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF SUCH A STATEMENT ON U.S.-AFGHAN-  
ISTAN RELATIONS? COULD OR SHOULD WE LINK SUCH A STATEMENT

TO CENTO, I.E. CROSSING OF THIS LINE WOULD BRING CENTO TO  
BEAR? WHAT WOULD BE THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH A STATEMENT?  
WHAT ABOUT FMS CREDITS FOR NON-AIRCRAFT PURCHASES? SHOULD  
WE SEEK SECURITY SUPPORT ASSISTANCE, RECOGNIZING THAT THIS  
MEANS AN END TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE? CAN WE REORGANIZE  
OUR PRIORITIES IN ORDER TO MOVE GREATER DEVELOPMENT LOAN  
AND PL 480 ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN? WHAT ABOUT REGIONAL  
FINANCING OF FRENCH OR OTHER POWER FACILITIES FOR PAKISTAN?

2. IRAN: ARE THERE STEPS WE CAN TAKE THAT WILL ENHANCE  
IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR AND COOPERATION WITH VULNERABLE RE-  
GIONAL STATES, I.E. PAKISTAN, OMAN AND NORTH YEMEN? SHOULD  
WE SEEK TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH IRAN IN IMPROVING THE  
WESTERN POSITION IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND WITH TURKEY? CAN  
WE LAY OUT A FRAMEWORK FOR ARMS TRANSFERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
THAT WILL RELIEVE THE GOI'S CONCERNS ABOUT OUR CONSTANCY  
AND YET BE BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TO CONGRESS?

3. AFGHANISTAN: IS OUR POLICY OF REMAINING IN AFGHANISTAN  
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OPTIONS FOR THEM A CORRECT COURSE OF  
ACTION? IS IT SO PERCEIVED BY REGIONAL COUNTRIES? HOW DO  
WE MEASURE ITS IMPACT, E.G. AFGHAN VOTE ON PUERTO RICO IN  
GROUP OF 24, AND HOW EXPLICIT ARE WE ON "CONDITIONS?" ARE  
THE FOLLOWING THREE GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUED ECONOMIC  
ASSISTANCE REALISTIC (A) ABSENCE OF INTERPARTY RELATIONS;  
(B) MFN TREATMENT FOR U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROGRAMS; (C) NO  
STIRRING UP OF PUSHTOONISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN ISSUES. DO WE  
COMMUNICATE THESE TO THE GOA? SHOULD WE CONSIDER AN EN-  
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HANCED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS, E.G. THE  
EUROPEANS, IRAN OR INDIA, TO DO SO?

4. INDIA: WHAT CAN WE DO TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RE-  
LATIONS OR, AT A MINIMUM, ENSURE THAT GOI WILL NOT MISUNDER-  
STAND U.S. REGIONAL INITIATIVES. SHOULD WE BECOME MORE IN-  
VOLVED IN INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS? SHOULD WE BE MORE  
FORTHCOMING ON INDIAN REQUESTS FOR MILITARY SALES, AT LEAST  
FOR MINOR ITEMS? COULD WE INITIATE SHIP VISITS WITHOUT  
RAISING THE LALL FORMULA ISSUE, E.G. LA SALLE TO BOMBAY?

5. IRAQ: HOW LIKELY IS INCREASED IRAQI CONCERN ABOUT  
SOVIET INTENTIONS TO LEAD TO GREATER WILLINGNESS TO CO-  
OPERATE WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IRAN AND/OR THE  
U.S? SHOULD WE PUSH FOR RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS?  
WILL IRAQ MODIFY/REDUCE ITS SUPPORT OF TERRORISM? WOULD  
A HIGH LEVEL VISIT BE USEFUL? IF SO, WHEN?

6. SAUDI ARABIA: WHAT CAN WE DO TO REASSURE THE SAUDIS?

WOULD THE SAUDIS COOPERATE IN AN INFORMAL REGIONAL EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN BY ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY

MEANS? WHAT DO THE SAUDIS WANT FROM US VIS A VIS THE PDRY, E.G. SUPPORT OF YAR INTERVENTION? HOW ABOUT VIS A VIS OMAN? WHAT TYPE OF POLITICAL "STROKING" WOULD BE USEFUL?

7. YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC: SHOULD WE DO MORE TO SUPPORT THE YAR? IS THE YAR INTERESTED IN/PREPARED TO/AND CAPABLE OF INTERVENTION IN PDRY AND WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS? SHOULD WE GIVE THIS OUR TACIT APPROVAL, E.G. PERMIT THIRD COUNTRIES ARMS TRANSFERS, INCREASE LETHAL ASSISTANCE, ETC.?

8. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN: IS THERE ANY SECRET

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POSSIBILITY OF SECURING BETTER RELATIONS WITH PDRY? HOW STABLE IS THIS GOVERNMENT AND WHAT WOULD BE THE SOVIET REACTION WERE BORDER DIFFICULTIES TO BE INITIATED BY ITS NEIGHBORS?

C. PSYCHOLOGICAL: ARE THERE POLITICAL/PUBLIC RELATIONS/PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVES WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE WITH RESPECT TO THE REGION AS A WHOLE? WOULD HIGH LEVEL VISITS BE USEFUL? WOULD A MAJOR SPEECH BE USEFUL? HOW SHOULD WE PORTRAY THE REGIONAL SITUATION TO THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS REALIZING THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO PORTRAYING A "COMMUNIST THREAT?"

IV. TO NEWSOM FROM MILLER: WE STILL DO NOT HAVE A DEFINITE DATE FOR THE PRC MEETING. THE DEPARTMENT HAS REQUESTED JULY 27 OR JULY 28 WHICH MEANS -- FOLLOWING THE TWO DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION RULE -- THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENDA WILL HAVE TO BE DISSEMINATED BY TUESDAY. SUGGEST CONVENING A MEETING WITH RELEVANT BUREAUS ON MONDAY TO REVIEW YOUR COMMENTS. ADVISE IF SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE SET UP.

WHILE MOST OF THOSE WHO HAVE READ THIS DRAFT AGENDA AGREE THAT IT IS TOO LONG TO BE COVERED IN ONE PRC MEETING, THERE IS NOT A CONSENSUS WHETHER THE AGENDA SHOULD ADDRESS SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS OR MORE BROADLY DEFINED THEORETICAL POLICY-ORIENTED QUESTIONS. THIS DRAFT CONTAINS ELEMENTS OF BOTH, BUT YOU MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WHICH APPROACH HAS GREATER MERIT.

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